CSR

Tesla · NHTSA safety record

2026 Tesla Model 3

Every safety complaint, recall and defect investigation the US government holds on this vehicle.

16

Complaints

7

Crashes

0

Fires

3

Injuries

0

Deaths

Owners of the 2026 Tesla Model 3 have filed 16 safety complaints with NHTSA between January 2026 and August 2026. The most complained-about system is forward collision avoidance, named in 5 of them (31%).

NHTSA has issued 1 recall covering this vehicle. A further 3 defect investigations are open and unresolved.

Recalls (1)

SEATS:CRITICAL FASTENERS

25V410000 · June 18, 2025

The defect
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2026 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles. The fasteners attaching the seat back to the seat bottom may have been improperly tightened.
The risk
The seat may not properly restrain the occupant, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
The remedy
Tesla Service Centers will inspect and tighten or replace the seat assembly fasteners as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed August 16, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-13-003.

Tesla, Inc. · up to 48 vehicles across all model years covered

Defect investigations (3)

An investigation means NHTSA has decided a pattern is worth examining. A preliminary evaluation is often closed with no action; an engineering analysis is the stage that usually precedes a recall.

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions

EA26002

Still open engineering analysis · opened March 18, 2026

the electrical system

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged

PE25012

Still open preliminary evaluation · opened October 7, 2025

the electrical system

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements

AQ25002

Still open audit query · opened August 20, 2025

the electrical system

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

What owners report

Complaints naming each system. One complaint can name several, so these add up to more than 16.

FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE 5 31%
UNKNOWN OR OTHER 5 31%
LANE DEPARTURE 4 25%
BACK OVER PREVENTION 3 19%
STEERING 3 19%
STRUCTURE 2 13%
SUSPENSION 2 13%
AIR BAGS 1 6%
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 1 6%
SEAT BELTS 1 6%
VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL 1 6%
WHEELS 1 6%

In owners' own words

Quoted from NHTSA's complaint file. These are unverified accounts by the people who filed them, not findings of fault.

SEAT BELTS

2 injured · crash · towed

I was involved in a rear-end collision while stopped at an intersection. The impact was significant. During the crash, the front airbags did not deploy. More importantly, the seat belts in both front seats (driver and front passenger) failed to function as expected. Instead of tightening during impact, the seat belts appeared to loosen, allowing excessive forward movement of the occupants. As a result, I was thrown forward and struck the steering wheel. The lack of seat belt pretensioning raises serious concerns about a potential failure of the vehicle’s restraint system. This incident suggests that the seat belt pretensioners and/or related crash detection systems may not have activated

NHTSA complaint 11732730, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

STRUCTURE:BODY

1 injured

While the vehicle was parked outdoors and the powered rear trunk lid was fully open, I leaned/bent forward into the trunk to retrieve an item. The edge of the trunk lid near the taillight assembly made contact with my scalp, causing a laceration. The wound bled significantly。The trunk lid’s fully-open position, combined with the geometry/edge of the liftgate near the taillight, creates a head-strike hazard for an average-height adult bending into the cargo area. I am requesting that NHTSA investigate whether the powered trunk lid’s open-position geometry presents an unreasonable risk of head injury to vehicle occupants/owners during normal use.

NHTSA complaint 11745391. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

STEERING

crash · towed

Firstly, we were driving in the center lane on I-84W (three lanes), with Full Self Driving (FSD) at 55 mph. The car veered left on it owns (under FSD) into the center median with the front driver side of the vehicle struck the metal beam guardrail causing both air bags to deploy on the driver and left rear passenger sides. The car continued to move forward in the next 4-6 seconds under FSD (approximately 10-20 feet range) and then came to a complete stop with flashing warning screen asking driver to take over the steering wheel immediately.

NHTSA complaint 11751300. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

STRUCTURE:BODY

crash

The vehicle's FSD system malfunctioned and initiated an unintended reverse toward a closing garage door. To prevent a total-loss event (the door crushing the glass roof and trunk), I was forced to perform an emergency manual takeover. Due to the vehicle's position caused by the malfunction, I had to maneuver through a confined space, resulting in the side-scrape. I am filing this as a malfunction claim because the damage was a direct consequence of the car's autonomous failure

NHTSA complaint 11711494. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL
The vehicle is experiencing severe, unpredictable software and hardware regressions related to the Full Self-Driving (Supervised) system (v14.3.7, Software build 2026.21.5) that create an immediate, active traffic hazard and a high risk of rear-end collisions. Primary Safety Issues: 1. TRAFFIC STALLS UPON DISENGAGEMENT: When Full Self-Driving (FSD) is engaged, auxiliary sensors malfunction, causing the headlights to cycle on/off and windshield wipers to run at full speed in clear, dry, midday daylight. When attempting to manually disengage FSD to correct these malfunctioning systems, the vehicle fails to smoothly transition control. Instead, it triggers critical red flashing alert lights,

NHTSA complaint 11757060, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

STEERING
I purchased my car on 3/23/26. Since delivery I have noticed that the car bounces at low speeds 20-30mph and the steering wheel vibrates at highway speeds 65 - 80mph. I have had the car to tesla service center 6 times since march. They have replaced all 4 tires, found and replaced a bent wheel (rim) on the passenger side. Then this last visit they replaced the passenger right wheel hub. They claim that when comparing it to the 1 other car available to road test my car was the same even though it still has the wheel vibration at highway speeds. they claim it falls within specs and is safe. I do not feel this is acceptable because they dont know what else to do. Now if I want them to check

NHTSA complaint 11755161, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

UNKNOWN OR OTHER
The horn system on the new Tesla are not effective. Other drivers cannot hear The unit is facing the ground, and a high speed. Other drivers. Can I hear it specially when it’s raining. The use of the original point was effective and never had a problem on my previous last Tesla, or any other car for that matter. Please help before a serious. Ask her that happens.

NHTSA complaint 11754350. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

UNKNOWN OR OTHER
After a recent Tesla software update, a mandatory Full Self-Driving disengagement feedback window appears every time I disengage FSD while the vehicle is still moving. The feedback window covers a large portion of the display with a black overlay, noticeable enough something popped up. There is no setting to disable it, dismiss it immediately, or postpone the response until the vehicle is stopped. I am required to select a disengagement reason before I can access the controls and information behind the overlay. While this window is displayed, I cannot properly view or control functions such as music and other touchscreen features behind the area. This is especially dangerous because it

NHTSA complaint 11752822, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

SUSPENSION
Air Suspension Failure - Damping Control Disabled (Code TAS_a313)" Description: "Vehicle is 2 days old. Suspension control module lost communication with CAN bus. Vehicle is in 'fail-safe' mode. Tesla Service Center has refused to assist. Safety risk due to loss of adaptive ride control." Manufacturer Response: "No response / Ignored."

NHTSA complaint 11752257. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

Compare

Other years of the Tesla Model 3

Model year Complaints Recalls Deaths
2025 113 3
2024 211 5
2023 415 12 1
2022 758 18 1
2021 656 22 8
2020 446 20 2
2019 607 21 4
2018 1,000 18
2017 26 15

Other 2026 Tesla models

Every Tesla on this site — 42 vehicles, 91 recall campaigns and 8 open investigation s.

If this is your car and a dealer keeps failing to fix it, your state's lemon law may require the manufacturer to replace it or buy it back. What each state asks for , read from the statutes.

Where these numbers come from

A complaint is one owner's account and has not been verified by NHTSA or by us. A vehicle with more complaints is not necessarily worse: models that sold in larger numbers collect more of them. How this is counted.

Compiled and maintained by
Independent developer and analyst