CSR

Tesla · NHTSA safety record

2025 Tesla Model Y

Every safety complaint, recall and defect investigation the US government holds on this vehicle.

93

Complaints

29

Crashes

2

Fires

13

Injuries

1

Deaths

Owners of the 2025 Tesla Model Y have filed 93 safety complaints with NHTSA between November 2024 and August 2026. The most complained-about system is forward collision avoidance, named in 42 of them (45%). The typical failure was reported at 5,829 miles, the median across the 2 complaints that gave an odometer reading.

NHTSA has issued 3 recalls covering this vehicle. A further 3 defect investigations are open and unresolved.

Recalls (3)

EQUIPMENT:OTHER:LABELS

26V315000 · May 19, 2026

The defect
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2025-2026 Model Y vehicles. The certification label may not have been installed. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 567, "Certification."
The risk
Missing weight information provided by the label may lead to unintentionally overloading the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
The remedy
Tesla Service will inspect and install a certification label as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 17, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-19-002.

Tesla, Inc. · up to 14,575 vehicles across all model years covered

BACK OVER PREVENTION:SOFTWARE

25V002000 · January 7, 2025

The defect
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024-2025 Model 3, Model S, 2023-2025 Model X, and Model Y vehicles. The computer circuit board may short, resulting in the loss of the rearview camera image. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 111, "Rear Visibility."
The risk
A rearview camera that does not display an image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
The remedy
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Tesla will also identify any vehicles that experienced a circuit board failure, or stress that may lead to a circuit board failure, and replace the affected computers, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 7, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-00-001.

Tesla, Inc. · up to 239,382 vehicles across all model years covered

TIRES:PRESSURE MONITORING AND REGULATING SYSTEMS

24V935000 · December 17, 2024

The defect
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 138, "Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems."
The risk
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
The remedy
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.

Tesla, Inc. · up to 696,281 vehicles across all model years covered · fixed by software update

Defect investigations (4)

An investigation means NHTSA has decided a pattern is worth examining. A preliminary evaluation is often closed with no action; an engineering analysis is the stage that usually precedes a recall.

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions

EA26002

Still open engineering analysis · opened March 18, 2026

the electrical system

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged

PE25012

Still open preliminary evaluation · opened October 7, 2025

the electrical system

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements

AQ25002

Still open audit query · opened August 20, 2025

the electrical system

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.

PE24033

Closed preliminary evaluation · opened January 6, 2025 · closed April 3, 2026

the electrical system

On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.

What owners report

Complaints naming each system. One complaint can name several, so these add up to more than 93.

FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE 42 45%
UNKNOWN OR OTHER 23 25%
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 16 17%
LANE DEPARTURE 16 17%
SERVICE BRAKES 15 16%
BACK OVER PREVENTION 14 15%
VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL 10 11%
STEERING 8 9%
VISIBILITY/WIPER 5 5%
AIR BAGS 4 4%
SEAT BELTS 4 4%
STRUCTURE 3 3%

When the complaints arrived

By the year NHTSA received them, which is not the year the failures happened. They peaked in 2025 at 47.

2024 2025 2026
2024 to 2026, the last of them a part year

In owners' own words

Quoted from NHTSA's complaint file. These are unverified accounts by the people who filed them, not findings of fault.

ENGINE

1 death · fire · crash · towed

The contact was an attorney calling on behalf of the owner of a 2025 Tesla Model Y. The contact stated that the owner was driving on a neighborhood street at an unknown speed with Autopilot engaged when vehicle control was lost. As a result, the vehicle crashed into a traffic light pole where it came to a stop and caught on fire. The owner was unable to exit the vehicle and was pronounced deceased on the scene. The origin of the fire was the lithium battery. The location of the fire was under the front end of the engine compartment where the battery was stored. The fire was extinguished by the fire department. A police report was filed. The vehicle was towed currently in the possession of

NHTSA complaint 11641739, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

STEERING

2 injured · crash · towed

On January 28, 2026, the vehicle (a Tesla Model Y) was operating with the Full Self-Driving (FSD) system actively engaged in normal highway traffic conditions. Without any prior warning messages, chimes, or system alerts, the FSD system abruptly disengaged approximately 1 second before the vehicle steered into a concrete road divider. Component failed: The Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD) software and underlying perception/control systems failed to maintain the lane and abruptly handed over control with insufficient time to react. The vehicle and its data are available for inspection. Safety risk: The sudden, sub-second disengagement provided the driver with zero time to react, take manual

NHTSA complaint 11718949, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

STEERING

2 injured · crash · towed

While driving straight ahead in my lane on a wet freeway in an active construction zone, the vehicle abruptly and without warning lost traction and spun out of control. I was traveling in a normal, controlled manner with the flow of traffic and was not turning, braking hard, or making any abrupt maneuver when the loss of control occurred. It was so sudden that I initially believed another vehicle had struck me. I was unable to recover control, and the vehicle left its lane and was involved in a collision that resulted in the vehicle being declared a total loss. This is a nearly new all-wheel-drive vehicle, approximately 17 months old, equipped with electronic stability and traction control.

NHTSA complaint 11756095, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL

2 injured · crash

On February 11, 2026, the 2025 Tesla Model Y "Vision AutoPark" system initiated an uncommanded high-speed reverse acceleration into a stationary yellow concrete bollard in a parking lot. The vehicle's vision-only parking assist hardware failed to detect a clearly visible, fixed obstruction and displayed a clear path on the system interface immediately before impact. No warning lamps, chimes, messages, or other alerts preceded the failure. The system provided zero indication of the imminent collision. The vehicle closed the distance to the bollard in under one second, exceeding human reaction time and making manual braking intervention impossible before impact. This failure mode — autonomous

NHTSA complaint 11717443, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

UNKNOWN OR OTHER
The exterior rear door handle on the driver’s side rear passenger door caught the occupant’s finger during normal use, tearing the fingernail partially out of the nail bed and causing bleeding and an exposed nail bed injury requiring medical treatment. The flush-mounted door handle pinched and trapped the finger while the door was being operated. The component is available for inspection upon request. No warning of any kind preceded the injury — the handle functioned as designed, which is the concern. The injury was treated at an urgent care facility. The problem has not been inspected by the manufacturer, dealer, police, or insurance to date. No warning lamps or messages are applicable.

NHTSA complaint 11757317, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

UNKNOWN OR OTHER

crash

Vehicle has complete Full Self-Driving (Supervised) capabilities. Vehicle was reverse parking on its own but the right side crashed into a wall. Vehicle did not stop reverse upon collision. Driver took over immediately to avoid further crash fatality.

NHTSA complaint 11755576. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

BACK OVER PREVENTION: WARNINGS

crash

Driver selected auto-park in parking area and car tried to self-park in a chosen spot adjacent to a pole and made several attempts to park and in the process hit a pole adjacent to the chosen parking spot. Immediately the incident was reported via Tesla app and photos were uploaded and an appointment was given for 8/6/2026 at 2:15pm at Tesla service Aliso Viejo. In reference to the pictures, car tried to park in spot 89 entering from spot 90, and made several attempts and driver expected the auto-park to be aborted giving up control to teh driver, but the car hit the pole and then driver took control to park.

NHTSA complaint 11754240. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL
The Full Self Driving software does not allow the user to limit the maximum speed of the vehicle while in use. The car frequently drives 15-20 MPH over the actual limits in typical driving modes with no ability for the user to safely and precisely restrict its speed to a more safe and appropriate level. The car may begin a journey at an appropriate speed, and continue at that speed for miles, but for no reason that is apparent to the user, the system may begin to accelerate beyond a safe limit. This makes the driving experience while using this software less predictable and compromises the safety of the user and others on the road. The user controlled speed limiting feature was previously

NHTSA complaint 11753209, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL
My 2025 Model Y with stalks creates an unsafe driving condition. Under current software, enabling FSD forces a single-pull lockout that completely disables standard Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC). (Advanced Driver Assistance Sytems) FSD routinely follows vehicles at less than a 1 second gap at 70-80 MPH and attempts unsafe merges with tractor-trailers. Drivers must be allowed to drop to TACC to maintain safe following distances without being forced to entirely disable FSD while parked. Because the software removes the single-pull/double-pull distinction, the driver cannot downgrade the system to standard cruise control on the fly to establish a safe following distance. To stop the

NHTSA complaint 11752724, quoted in part. Filed by an owner and not verified by NHTSA or by us.

Compare

Other years of the Tesla Model Y

Model year Complaints Recalls Deaths
2026 315 7
2024 311 5
2023 1,129 17 1
2022 845 20 103
2021 1,054 23 4
2020 272 24

Other 2025 Tesla models

Every Tesla on this site — 42 vehicles, 91 recall campaigns and 8 open investigation s.

If this is your car and a dealer keeps failing to fix it, your state's lemon law may require the manufacturer to replace it or buy it back. What each state asks for , read from the statutes.

Where these numbers come from

A complaint is one owner's account and has not been verified by NHTSA or by us. A vehicle with more complaints is not necessarily worse: models that sold in larger numbers collect more of them. How this is counted.

Compiled and maintained by
Independent developer and analyst