An investigation means NHTSA has decided a pattern is worth examining. A
preliminary evaluation is often closed with no action; an engineering
analysis is the stage that usually precedes a recall.
Lower Lateral Link detachment
PE26006
Still open preliminary evaluation · opened July 29, 2026
the suspension
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur. Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
EA26002
Still open engineering analysis · opened March 18, 2026
the electrical system
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged
PE25012
Still open preliminary evaluation · opened October 7, 2025
the electrical system
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements
AQ25002
Still open audit query · opened August 20, 2025
the electrical system
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.
PE24033
Closed preliminary evaluation · opened January 6, 2025 · closed April 3, 2026
the electrical system
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
PE24031
Closed preliminary evaluation · opened October 17, 2024 · closed March 18, 2026
the electrical system
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
Recall 23V838 Remedy Effectiveness
RQ24009
Still open recall query · opened April 25, 2024
the electrical system
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
Loss of steering control
EA24001
Closed engineering analysis · opened February 1, 2024 · closed June 25, 2026 · led to recall 25V092
the steering
On July 28, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23014) to investigate instances of loss of electronic power-assisted steering in MY 2023 Tesla Model 3 and MY 2023 Tesla Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla, Inc. The complaints allege a sudden and unexpected inability to turn the steering wheel or an increase in effort required to turn the steering wheel. These conditions were alleged to occur both during the drive cycle, at various speeds, and at vehicle start up. Consumers reported receiving the warning message “Steering assist reduced” either before, during, or after the loss of steering control, and some consumers described their steering begin to feel “notchy” or “clicky” either prior to or just after the incident. On February 1, 2024, PE23014 was upgraded to EA24001 to further investigate the alleged defect in the affected vehicles. Tesla identified the cause of the increase in steering effort as an overvoltage breakdown (the voltage applied exceeds the maximum design limit), which can overstress motor drive components on the printed circuit board of the vehicle’s steering Electronic Control Unit (ECU). If the primary motor drive components experienced an overvoltage breakdown occurrence while the vehicle was traveling above 0 mph, electronic power-assisted steering would be diverted to secondary motor drive components. The secondary, or backup, motor drive components would maintain electronic power-assisted steering until the vehicle reached 0 mph. If the vehicle was operating on the secondary system and reached 0 mph, the driver would lose electronic power-assisted steering with manual steering remaining available. Only manual steering would remain until the vehicle’s steering ECU is replaced. On February 19, 2025, Tesla filed safety recall 25V092 to address the loss of electronic power-assisted steering. The recall filing documents state that a steering ECU software update, identified as 2023.38.4, was introduced into production vehicles and provided to affected fleet vehicles through an over-the-air (OTA) update beginning in October 2023. The updated software was designed to prevent overvoltage breakdown and overstress of motor drive components on the printed circuit board. ODI’s analysis of related Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) and Tesla field data found that complaint traffic declined following the 2023.38.4 software release. In view of the recall action taken by Tesla, ODI is closing this EA. ODI will continue to monitor the effectiveness of the remedy as is consistent with the Agency’s authority and practice. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Loss of steering control
PE23014
Closed preliminary evaluation · opened July 28, 2023 · closed February 5, 2024
the steering
On July 28, 2023, The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23-014) after receiving 12 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting loss of steering control in model years (MY) 2023 Tesla Model 3 and Y vehicles. During PE23-014, ODI interviewed complainants, sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla, and convened technical meetings with Tesla that included a joint inspection of a crashed vehicle. The investigation identified 2,388 total complaints regarding the alleged defect, including 124 complaints through VOQs and 2,264 complaints through manufacturer data. ODI is associating 1 crash to this investigation (11544655), where a driver was unable to complete a right hand turn in the intersection and hit a vehicle. This vehicle was subject to a joint inspection by ODI and Tesla. The steering rack was recovered by ODI with the consumer’s permission. ODI’s interviews of allegations supplied to the agency, in the form of VOQs, identified patterns of the incoming complaint traffic. Complaints allege an inability to turn the steering wheel, while other complaints allege an increase in required effort to turn the steering wheel. These conditions were reported to occur during the drive cycle as well as at start-up. Approximately one-third of complaints with a reported speed occurred at vehicle start-up or speeds less than 5 mph. Interviews with failures reported at speeds over 5 mph, half reported an inability to turn the steering wheel. A majority of complaints with a reported speed reported between 5 mph and 35 mph with approximately 1 in 10 occurring on open roads at speeds 35 mph and over. The highest reported speed regarding an alleged inability to turn the steering wheel is 75 mph. A majority of allegations reported seeing a warning message, “Steering assist reduced”, either before, during or after the loss of steering control. A portion of drivers described their steering begin to feel “notchy” or “clicky” either prior to or just after the incident. There have been multiple allegations of drivers blocking intersections and/or roadways. ODI is aware of over 50 vehicles which were allegedly towed as a result of the condition from a variety of areas including, driveways, parking lots, side of road and intersections. Multiple complaints state they were able to temporarily remedy the condition by power cycling the vehicle, but the issue reoccurred until the steering rack was replaced. Tesla supplied four steering rack part numbers on the subject vehicles. The investigation identified part numbers, 1044832-00-A and 1188832-00-A accounted for 2,187 of the complaints and 4 did not have original part number in the information request. ODI has upgraded PE23-014 to an Engineering Analysis (EA24-001) due to continued complaint traffic and to characterize the system conditions leading to- and stemming from- the alleged defect in vehicles supplied with steering rack part numbers 1044832-00-A and 1188832-00-A To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Sudden Unintended Acceleration
DP23002
Still open defect petition · opened June 29, 2023
vehicle speed control
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
Defect Petition Interlock Request
DP23001
Closed defect petition · opened April 7, 2023 · closed March 18, 2026
unknown or other
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
Steering Wheel Detachment
PE23003
Closed preliminary evaluation · opened March 4, 2023 · closed April 24, 2026
the steering
On March 4, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE23003 to investigate two reports of steering loss on model year (MY) 2023 Tesla Model Y vehicles due to the detachment of the steering wheel from the steering column while the vehicle was in motion. ODI confirmed from Tesla that in both cases, the vehicles were delivered to the owners missing the retaining bolt (P/N 1036655-00-A) used to secure the steering wheel to a splined shaft on the steering column. Tesla repaired both vehicles under warranty. ODI further learned that both 2023 MY Model Y vehicles had been manufactured in the first week of January 2023 at Tesla’s Austin, TX and Fremont, CA manufacturing facilities, respectively. Both vehicles had received end of production line repairs (rectification) requiring removal and reinstallation of the steering wheel before release from the factory. End of line rectification is an offline process manufacturers use to repair any defects found prior to vehicle release from the factory. It often requires removing and reinstalling unrelated components to access and correct the issue detected during inspections. This service process usually takes place outside the assembly line’s standard quality-control safeguards, introducing the risk of an incomplete or incorrect repair. On April 28, 2023, ODI sent an Information Request letter to Tesla requesting production data and steering wheel detachment reports for all MY 2022 – 2023 Tesla models; numbers of vehicles undergoing end of line steering wheel removals / reinstallations; information about Tesla’s procedures and process controls pertaining to this activity; and Tesla’s assessment of the alleged defect. ODI sent three sets of follow-up questions to Tesla in April, May, and June of 2025 to request a field data update, fleet mileage data, and further information concerning Tesla’s rectification processes and its 2023 internal assessments. ODI’s analysis of Tesla’s submissions and other relevant data revealed that: - No additional related incidents have occurred in either the subject or peer vehicles. - The subject vehicles suffered their steering wheel detachments below 400 miles of service, indicating that any other vehicles experiencing this issue would have already experienced a steering wheel detachment. - ODI identified additional circumstances indicating that rectification taking place outside of January 2023 do not exhibit missing steering wheel fasteners. - After the recognition of both failures, Tesla applied additional controls on vehicles receiving end of line rectification. Since this investigation’s opening, the subject and peer fleet have accumulated an average of 33,000 miles of service with three vehicles reporting under 500 miles and six reporting no mileage, making the likelihoodof any undiscovered missing steering wheel fasteners extremely low. Accordingly, no evidence has been identified to indicate that the alleged defect exists outside the two 2023 incidents that prompted the opening of PE23003, and this PE is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Autopilot System Driver Controls
EA22002
Closed engineering analysis · opened June 8, 2022 · closed April 25, 2024 · led to recall 23V085
the electrical system
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Unexpected Brake Activation
PE22002
Closed preliminary evaluation · opened February 16, 2022 · closed June 29, 2026
forward collision avoidance
On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 – 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as “phantom braking”. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to open PE22002. VOQ narratives reported unexpected brake activation while using TACC, Autopilot or FSD. The trend grew from 99 by the end of 2021 to 314 by February 16, 2022, when PE22002 was opened. ODI sent Information Request (IR) Letters to Tesla on May 4, 2022, and July 11, 2024, to request salient data to quantify vehicle production, field incidents, and the physical parameters of the phantom braking reports. ODI also requested information pertaining to Tesla’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. Typically, the complaints to ODI and Tesla allege a 10-20 mph speed reduction at highway speeds over a 1-3 second time period.No collisions were identified. Drivers reported seeing no vehicles ahead in the travel lane that would have triggered the deceleration. Many complaints reported the conditions taking place on higher speed roadways in sunny conditions with shadows on the roadway. Complainants typically applied the accelerator to override the unexpected deceleration, and subject vehicles did not come to a complete stop or steer out of their travel lane. ODI analyzed data provided by Tesla in addition to consumer complaints submitted to ODI. Tesla’s complaint and field data exhibited some behavior that aligned with the transition from a radar-vision fusion system to vision-only in mid-2021. VOQ traffic coincided with public events such as Recall 21V846, the opening of PE22002, and several related media publications. In February and March of 2022, Tesla released firmware updates 2022.4.5.1 and 2022.4.5.17 respectively to target aspects of the subject system programming that affect unexpected deceleration. Incident traffic has dissipated substantially in the past years, with 45 incidents reported in 2024, 19 in 2025, and 3 since the beginning of 2026. The conditions reported, while concerning to the drivers, did not alter the vehicle’s lateral positioning in their lanes and did not cause significant loss in distance between the subject and following vehicle to lead to a collision. Complaint traffic to both NHTSA and Tesla reported the same conditions- vehicles traveling with the subject system engaged at higher speeds decelerating suddenly with no commensurate vehicle or obstacle ahead in the same lane. In view of these points, and a low demonstrated hazard to drivers, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.