An investigation means NHTSA has decided a pattern is worth examining. A
preliminary evaluation is often closed with no action; an engineering
analysis is the stage that usually precedes a recall.
DTN Air Bag Inflator Rupture
EA25005
Still open engineering analysis · opened October 21, 2025
the air bags
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has become aware of eight vehicle crashes in which a rupture of a Jilin Province Detiannuo Automobile Safety System Co., Ltd. (DTN) air bag inflator occurred during the deployment of the driver side air bag. All eight drivers in these crashes sustained serious or fatal injuries that appear linked to the ruptures. Six of those drivers sustained fatal injuries and two sustained severe injuries. In all eight incidents, the subject inflators had been installed as replacement equipment after the vehicle was involved in a previous crash. Information gathered during NHTSA’s initial analysis of these incidents indicates that the inflators were potentially imported illegally into the United States. In conjunction with this safety investigation, NHTSA is also working with appropriate authorities to address any illegal activities associated with the importation of these inflators. As a result of the significant safety concerns relating to these inflators, as well as extensive information already obtained by ODI relating to their field ruptures, ODI is moving directly to the Engineering Analysis (EA) stage of its investigative process rather than first opening a Preliminary Evaluation. NHTSA has taken a variety of actions to address the risks posed by the importation of substandard or counterfeit air bag components. However, until recently, these risks appeared spread across a variety of components and manufacturers. As part of ODI’s continuous monitoring of this issue, the agency has obtained information to suggest that at least eight incidents involve ruptures of inflators manufactured by DTN. In parallel with this dedicated investigation into DTN inflators, ODI will continue to monitor reports of field incidents to evaluate risks from other substandard imported air bag components. In 2012, ODI first became aware of substandard or counterfeit air bag modules sold through online marketplaces, such as auction sites. NHTSA obtained examples of these air bag modules and conducted testing. None of the inflators equipped in these modules were manufactured by DTN. This testing revealed that the inflators consistently malfunctioned during deployments, such as by failing to deploy the air bag or expelling metal shrapnel due to a rupture. This led NHTSA to release a consumer advisory in October 2012 to alert the public and repair professionals to the potential dangers of substandard or counterfeit air bag modules. ODI also worked with major vehicle manufacturers, who released advisories and notifications concerning the use of such air bag modules. Since then, NHTSA has continuously monitored for reports of malfunctioning air bags that may be associated with substandard or counterfeit components. These monitoring efforts have been supported by the increased visibility the advisories have brought to the issue, and by several standing general orders in place as part of separate investigations into Takata and ARC inflators, which require certain manufacturers to report any alleged or suspected inflator field ruptures to NHTSA. Until 2017, ODI was not aware of any field incidents involving an abnormal deployment of an imported substandard or counterfeit air bag module. In September 2017, ODI became aware of a crash involving a model year (MY) 2009 Honda Civic where the air bag ruptured during deployment, killing the driver. After inspecting the vehicle and air bag parts, ODI determined that the air bag inflator was not original equipment and that the air bag module was likely a substandard import. Insufficient information existed to determine the manufacturer of the inflator in this incident, however, it does not appear to resemble those manufactured by DTN. On June 16, 2023, ODI received a Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ #11527380) alleging that the rupture of a driver side air bag caused fatal injuries to the driver of a MY 2020 Chevrolet Malibu. ODI’s assessment of the rupture indicated that the air bag inflator was not original equipment but was instead manufactured by DTN, a Chinese company (also known as Yoshibayashi Toku theanol Automotive Safety Systems Co. Ltd.). From June 2023 to July 2024, ODI became aware of four additional ruptures involving substandard air bag modules equipped on Chevrolet Malibu vehicles. At the time, insufficient information existed for these crashes to determine who manufactured the ruptured inflators. As a result, NHTSA released a consumer advisory on July 10, 2024, alerting car buyers and owners to be aware of cheap, substandard replacement air bag inflators that can cause death or serious injury in a crash. The advisory urged consumers who own or are considering the purchase of a used vehicle to learn the vehicle’s history and ensure the vehicle has genuine air bag inflators. In March 2025, NHTSA learned about another rupture involving a suspected substandard, aftermarket inflator that was equipped in a MY 2017 Hyundai Sonata. The driver of this vehicle sustained fatal injuries that appeared related to the rupture. In August 2025, NHTSA received a similar report of a fatal air bag rupture in a MY 2019 Hyundai Sonata. Most recently, in October 2025, ODI received a report of a fatal air bag rupture in a MY 2020 Chevrolet Malibu. Photographs of the air bag components in these three crashes indicated that the ruptures all involved inflators manufactured by DTN. Further investigation of the inflator fragments in three of the prior incidents confirmed that they also involved DTN inflators. Photographs of the components involved in one of the other incidents also strongly suggest that the ruptured inflator was manufactured by DTN. This opening resume exceeded space limitations and is continued in an attachment uploaded to the investigation.
Loss of Motive Power
DP22003
Closed defect petition · opened September 12, 2022 · closed December 12, 2023
the engine
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) received a letter dated July 13, 2022, petitioning the Agency to initiate a safety defect investigation into loss of motive power allegations attributed to oil drain pan assembly failures on certain Hyundai Motor America, Inc. and Kia America, Inc. vehicles spanning Model Years (MY) 2005-2021. The Petitioners cited examples of complaints indicating that the subject vehicles were experiencing rapid loss of engine oil due to oil drain plug back outs, resulting in loss of motive power and/or catastrophic engine damage. Additional complaints were provided which alleged that the oil drain pans lack sufficient structural integrity and are susceptible to cracking. The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11481745. On September 12, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition (DP22-003) to evaluate the Petitioners’ request. The Petitioners have provided additional complaints within four supplemental letters dated January 31, 2023, March 21, 2023, May 23, 2023, and August 4, 2023. ODI’s evaluation included the review and analysis of the complaints and supporting information submitted by the Petitioners, as well as additional complaints submitted directly to NHTSA which referenced either the oil drain plug or a crack in the oil pan. After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into the oil drain pan assemblies of the subject vehicles. Based on a review of the available information, a loss of motive power resulting from an oil drain plug back out has not occurred between the initial sale of a vehicle and the completion of its first oil change. If during an oil change service, a technician fails to remove the existing drain plug gasket before installing a new gasket, it is likely that a proper seal between the drain plug and the oil pan will not be made. An improper seal between the drain plug and oil pan could lead to the backing out on the drain plug, resulting in the sudden loss of oil while driving. Additionally, the provided examples of oil pan cracks were localized to the immediate vicinity of the oil drain plug and/or appeared to be the result of direct-contact with a tool during servicing. There is no information to support that a vehicle-based defect exists relating to the oil pan assembly, and instead the documented incidents are related to the failure to follow the proper maintenance procedures during oil change service. In October 2023, Hyundai published a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) that provided detailed instructions for oil change service on its gasoline powered vehicles, specifically highlighting the need to remove and replace the existing drain plug gasket prior to reinstalling the drain plug. After a thorough review of the material submitted by the petitioner, the information already in NHTSA's possession, and the potential risks to motor vehicle safety implicated by the petitioners' allegations, NHTSA does not believe that a formal investigation is warranted. Therefore, the petition is denied. A Federal Register Notice (FRN) further detailing NHTSA’s reasons for denial of the petition will be published. The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP22-003. To review those complaints and the additional complaints ODI added to its evaluation which are cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Electrical overstress
EA19001
Closed engineering analysis · opened April 19, 2019 · closed September 19, 2024 · led to recall 20V024
the air bags
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW. The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications. The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU. In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle. Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time. In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners. Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.